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Editors' Note:
Professor Dombrowski's essay was
presented at the December, 1988
Eastern Division meeting of the
Society for the Study of Ethics and
Animals (held in Washington,
nc.) as a response to a paper
delivered by Professor Judith Barad,
of Indiana State University, and
entitled "Aquinas' Inconsistency on
the Nature and the Treatment of
Animals.' Professor Barad's essay
was published in the Spring, 1988
issue of Between the Species (Vol.
4, no. Z).

y purpose in this article is to
comment favorably on a recent
article by Judith Barad, an
article which claimed that
Thomas Aquinas was not a speciesist without
qualification because he had an inconsistent attitude toward animals. That is, Aquinas should
have had a more favorable attitude toward
animals than he apparently did because of some
principles which were fundamental to his own
thought. My comments will lead to some rather
broad speculations regarding how we should view
the history of thought on animals.
Barad's article does not leave the taste one
gets from that type of history of philosophy
which returns to the past purely for the sake of
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ology one uses to study Kant but by the fact
that in the Anglo-American philosophical
world Kant is usually studied as the culmination of the period from Descartes and Locke,
whereas in Germany he is more often studied
as the start of a period which ends with Hegel
and Marx. This "mere" change in from-to
perspective to some extent, at least, changes
one's view of Kant.2
Regarding the history of philosophic
thought on animals I, at least, have focused
on the following from-to perspective: from
Pythagoras to Plotinus there were many
thinkers who showed profound respect for
animals, among them Pythagoras and Platinus
themselves, as well as Plato, Theophrastus,
Plutarch, and Porphyry. At the end of the
classical period, however, the favorable treatment of animals died out, for the most part,
among philosophers until the nineteenth
century. On the assumption that focusing on
this from-to perspective gave the best vision of
the past, the period from Aquinas to
Descartes appeared to be one where the bad
got worse, in that Descartes was, as Peter
Singer puts it, the absolute nadir, Cottingham's efforts to the contrary not withstanding. A corollary of this from-to perspective
was that one could easily understand the
movement from Descartes to LaMettrie to
factory farming and vivisection with equanimity. That is, Descartes' view of animals as
mere machines made it possible to view
animals as commodities and mere objects for
pithing. And Descartes' view of human
beings as machines with mere ghosts in them
led, as Leonora Rosenfield has shown,3 to
LaMettrie's {not to mention Ryle's} rather
convenient exorcism of the ghosts.
As a consequence of Barad's article,
however, we are forced to re-focus our historical lenses when we look at the transition from

antiquarian lore, as would have been the
case if she found out what Aquinas said
about animals merely to fill one more niche
in the historian's edifice, so that all topics in
all philosophers would be commented on.
She avoids another evil. That is, doing
rancid violence to a past thinker through a
crude {usually anachronistic} appropriation
of him for the purposes of present philosophizing. It should be noted, however, that at
times it is quite legitimate to lean in this
direction, as in the half-informed whipping
and gnashing Descartes has received by
defenders of animal rights. The legitimacy of
these polemical uses of Descartes becomes
apparent when we read John Cottingham's
well-informed, nuanced, and nonetheless
unconvincing attempt to make Descartes'
view of animals more palatable.!
It is difficult for us to tell whether it is
Barad's philosophical sources which are being
interpreted or if it is her interpretive efforts
which are being textually grounded. Historical
objectivity increases along with this difficulty.
But perhaps the most complimentary thing
I can say about Barad's article is that it made
me think seriously about some of the biggest
issues regarding the history of the philosophic
treatment of animals, and, I confess, it made
me revise some of my own views of that
history. Specifically, as a consequence of
Barad's article I think we should get clear on
how our "from-to" perspective operates in the
history of the philosophic treatment of
animals and how our choice of such a perspective affects how we will digest the
thought of a particular thinker or of a particular historical period. To take a preliminary
example from outside the philosophic treatment of animals, consider how one's
approach to Kant's epistemology is affected
not so much by which contemporary method-
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Aquinas' (and Francis of Assisi's) thirteenth
century to Descartes' seventeenth. Indeed,
there is hardly a transition here at all, but
rather a radical break. Because of Barad's
article we are forced to ask: how does one get
from Aquinas to Descartes? Both were anthropocentrists, but Aquinas' epistemology, psychology, and his Lovejoy-like great-chain-ofbeing metaphysics militate against his anthropocentrism - hence Barad's charge of inconsistency. Descartes is frustrating because he is
so consistent. He views animals as machines,
and there is very little, if anything, in his
thought to indicate that he should have held
otherwise.
Might it be the case that all of the major
pre-modem philosophers are either morally
sympathetic to animals or are thinkers whose
lack of moral sympathy with animals conflicts
with claims that are central to these thinkers'
philosophies? This is a broad claim, but consider that the two major pre-modem opponents to what we today would call "animal
rights" were Aristotle and Aquinas. The
former's greatest pupil and literary executor,
Theophrastus, made us aware of Aristotle's
inconsistency regarding animals,4 and now a
similar argument regarding Aquinas' inconsistency is offered by Barad.
If this broad claim is correct, or at least
largely correct, one can easily imagine two
reasons why it is so. First, almost all of the
pre-modem philosophers believed in, or
flirted with, either panpsychism or hylomorphism, positions which, it seems, are far more
compatible with care for nonhuman nature
than either Cartesian dualism (which sees
most of nature as amenable for enslavement,
with a few scattered minds strewn about as
exceptions to the rule) or Cartesian dualism's
assumed alternative in modem or contemporary philosophy, some sort of materialistic or
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mechanistic monism (in which one has the
difficult project of justifying respect for anything, even respect for human beings 5).
That is, in the effort to explain the apparent differences between mental phenomena
and terms, on the one hand, and bodily phe-
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modern philosophers are either
morally sympathetic to animals
or are thinkers whose lack of
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conflicts with claims that are
central to these thinkers'
philosophies?

nomena and terms, on the other, three
options logically exhaust the alternatives, the
first two of which have dominated philosophy
since Descartes. Either (1) this apparent
duality is real, as Descartes suggested - a
view which has disastrous consequences for
animals - or (2) the mental phenomena and
terms can in some way or other be reduced to
bodily phenomena or terms - a view which
also has disastrous consequences for animals,
and perhaps for human beings as well, in that
the basic constituents of reality are seen as
inert, lifeless, devoid of internal significance.
Moral significance arises tenuously only when
these mechanical building blocks are configured in certain (often arbitrary) ways, say
when they make it possible for a human being
eventually to utter propositions. On Richard
Rorty's version of this view, moral significance
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sessed by human beings, an individualism
which actually makes a virtue of amoral selfinterest, if not of selfishness.?
I admit that the two most important
defenders of animal rights in recent debates
have both been involved in the continuation
of intellectual projects started in post-Cartesian philosophy. Singer can be seen as the
inheritor of Bentham's and Mill's concern for
animals, and Regan's thought can be seen as a
(peculiar) elaboration of principles found in
Kant and G.E. More. But as a consequence of
reading Barad's article, I am more convinced
than ever that there is also a great deal to be
learned from those contemporary defenders of
animal rights who take as their starting points
the classics of pre-modem philosophy; in particular I am thinking of Stephen R.L. Clark. 8
Clark is instructive regarding how the virtuebased approach to ethics can supplement, at
the very least, utilitarian and deontological
defenses of animals.
It is not my aim to deny any continuity
between Aquinas and modern philosophers,
say between Aquinas and Kant regarding the

does not exist before such utterances can be
made. 6 But it is not often noticed these days
that there is a second alternative to dualism.
(3) One can attribute (on the grounds provided by several sorts of evidence) some mode of
life or activity or form to the constituents even
of bodily phenomena, thereby explaining how
internal relations, and hence inherent value,
are possible. Both (Platonic-Whiteheadian)
panpsychism and (Aristotelian-ThomisticPeircian) hylomorphism are versions of this
third view, which is not only compatible with,
but actually provides the only possible metaphysical foundation for, Tom Regan's theory of
inherent value. (I make this suggestion in spite
of the fact that Regan himself may not be particularly interested in metaphysical foundations.) After reading the various criticisms of
Regan's views, I think it is fair to say that what
(unfortunately) bothers most people is not so
much that Regan says that animals have
inherent value, but that anything has inherent
value. It should be noted that hardly any premodern philosopher would criticize Regan on
these grounds.
A second reason can also be imagined
which would support the broad claim made
above regarding the significant gap between
Aquinas and Descartes. It is often held that
speciesism is due to the Judeo-Christian tradition, and I think that there is some legitimacy
to this claim. But the aforementioned gap
between Aquinas and many, if not most, postCartesian philosophical treatments of animals
should force us to consider seriously the
'origins of modem speciesism, a speciesism
which is intensified by precisely those phenomena in the history of ideas which made
their first appearance in the period between
Aquinas and Descartes. I speak of a supposedly free market economy and its attendant, an
exaggerated metaphysical individualism pos-
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more eager to become armchair classicists
and medievalists.

claim that we do not owe respect to animals
directly, but only indirectly when they are
our neighbor's property. But even here dis,
continuity should have the upper hand
because property, for Aquinas, is legitimate
only within the confines of some larger
moral or theological purpose, whereas Kant
travels a great distance down the road which
leads to property as an absolute right for
individual human beings. Once again, it is
not insignificant to note that between these
two thinkers lies the triumph of instrumental
reason, of techne over sophia, of animals as
industrial (or post' industrial) tools.
I should end, I suppose, by apologizing for
not talking about Barad's article directly, but
I hope it is clear that what I have said is
indirectly connected to her article. It is
because Aristotle's and Aquinas' positions
regarding animals are so complex that I have
suggested that we re-focus our from-to perspectives so as to consider in detail the
period from Aquinas to Descartes, in particu,
lar, and from pre'modem to modem philosophy, in general.
And I have at least threatened to show in
a short space that such a re-focusing would
have important consequences for how we
should think about the influence of the
Judeo-Christian tradition on thought about
animals, but more importantly for how we
should think about the influence of modem
political economy on thought regarding
animals and about the contemporary dogma
that if Cartesian dualism is untenable then
the only alternative is some variety of materialistic monism. Such a re,focusing, I also
allege, would allow us to see some worth,
while features of virtue,based ethics not
mentioned by Alasdair Macintyre. In short,
such a re,focusing of from,to perspective
would make defenders of animal rights a bit
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